Wake up, Tamils! by Rajan Hoole An even darker gloom hangs over the future of the country and particularly the Tmils followng the bomb explosion in Colombo where a suicide bomber ended her life together with the lives of 55 others, including that of the UNPs presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayeke. Where this differed from such incidents earlier was that we were at the begining of negotiating a settlement to our devastating civil war. Where the new government led by Chdria KuMaratunga was concerned, the sincerety was beyond question. Nor were major snags envisaged on the government's side at this juncture. A particular incident gives an indication of the Prime Minister's mind. She drove up to the residence of the leader of a Tamil group and went to talk to him without any security. The leader who himself faced a security threat thought her rather reckless. She spoke to him words to the effect, "I am very desirous of bringing an end to this conflict. I do not know how, but we have to get the Tamil groups and talk to them. We will be talking to all the groups including the LTTE. But, at this stage I do not have a settled programme." The peace process The most important element in the course for peace was that the ground in the South was being firmly prepared among the masses by a number of democratic groups through journals, publications and mass meetings. Traditional chauvinistic possitions came under at- tack. Even the Buddhist hierachy was not spared. Mrs. Kumaratunga herself attacked chavinistic positions during her presidential campaign. She accused those holding them of wanting to kill Sinhalese Buddhist youth on the battlefields of the North-East in the name of saving the Sinhala Buddhist nation. But on the Tamil side there was no public reappraisal, nor was there any movement, even say at the level of intellectuals, cler- gy or students, to discuss matters pertaining to peace. It was clear that the LTTE would not permit even a glimmer of democra- tisation. The message was given to the people in a number of ways that the peace talks publicly endorsed by the leader would be an expedient managed entirely by the LTTE. Terror and dissimulation Reactions of Sinhalese to the recent bomb blast gave us some in- sight into how polarised this country has become. But beyond that there was dispair about the chances of peace. At the same time many of them continued to be open about what they felt. Among Tamils, reactions ranged from evasion to callousness show- ing also the atomisation of Tamil society. The first reaction in Jaffna to an incident such as the bomb blast is invariably one of fear and hopelessness. These are reflections of a cultural transformation that has its origins in the legitimisation of a violent Tamil nationalism by the July 1983 holocaust and the use of the state terror against the community on one hand and the total control of the LTTE in the North on the other. The LTTE offered the elite enough space to safeguard their personal and institutional interests provided they fell in line with its regime. The process of adjustment also left its imprint on character. Sections of the elite and Christian clergy while being compromised with the oppressive re- gime in the North through directly legitimizing it or turning a blind eye to its violations against Tamil people themselves, re- ceived a new unprecidented importance in Colombo and the world. They came to be treated as spokesmen for the oppressed Tamil people - with the state allowed to be the sole oppressor. Such phenomena contributed to the legitimization of the LTTE among the Tamil diaspora and in Colombo. It helped the Tamil el- ite to feel good while sympathising with the LTTE without raising key questions about the nature of the LTTE, its history, what it was doing to the Tamil community and what it meant for the fu- ture. The absence of a political discussion In this atmosphere it is hardly surprising that there is no seri- ous discussion of cruicial issues. The leading Tamil parliamen- tary party, the TULF, is mostly inert. Prof. Suriyakumaran is an experienced civil servant closely involved in negotiations on the ethnic issue between national leaders from the 50's. At a recent seminar he gave an account of his experiences, the con- stitutional issues and testifying to the ernestness with which S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayeke, Sirimavobandaranaike had approached the problem. The blame for the failure he said was not unmixed. President Premedasa had talked to the LTTE until June 1990 when the war was resumed Suriyumaran testified to the gravity with which Prcmdaa had addressed the vexed question of colonisation, even checking some leading mililary men who wanted to dodge the issue. Then asked what went wrong, Prof. Suriyaumaran reportedly admitted that he was puzzled. Compared wih his painstaking study of the state and its working, Prof. Suriyakumaran had evidently done little homework on thc LTTE. Much of what passes for Tamil opinion in the press, at seminars and at NGO sponsored peace conferences is just plain posturig that plays safe with the LTTE. One of thce important recent issues was the ceasefire called by the LTTE at the outset of negotiations. The people in the pro- vinces had a traumatic experience with thc ceasefire which ended in July 199O. For some months until then the the LTTE ran these areas while the army stayed in camps. The manner in which it end- ed found an incenced army coming out and massacreing civilians and hunting down even persons with inocuous dealings with the LTTE. It was clear that ceasefire to be meaningful had to be ac- companied by a process of demil itarisation and a resumption of normal democratic activity with acountabilily. Only such could minimise the prospect of recurrence of what happened in June 1990. Apart from this, other questions remained to be answered: whether a ceasefire would entail greater freedom and accountability for the people in hitherto army controlled areas? How it would af- fect relations belween Tamils and Muslims, which were on the mend after going through a bad period? The LTTE leaders position during a recent BBC interview on he return of Muslims expelled >from Jaffna cannot be encouraging for the Muslims as a whole. He maintained that the Muslims could reurn to Jaffna provided the army vacated the islands, whose Tamil refugees are supposedly in ocupation of Muslim houses in Jaffna! What would have been the position if the Sri Lankan Government had expelled the Tam- ils from Colombo and maintained that they cannot return because their houses are occupied by Sinhalese forces to leave Jaffna? What happened in the event was that several articulate Tamil spokesmen and popular Tamil newspapers based in Colombo echoed the LTTE call for a ceasefire without examining the issues. In the provinces many were larmed at the prospect of having to go through the same harrowing experiences again, but were in no po- sition to voice their fears. Experienced Tamil leaders who privately expressed concern found it prudent to keep silent. The LTTE: some salient aspects A good deal of the recent history of the Tamils has been record- ed. Moreover Sabaratnam Sabalingam and Rajini Thiranagama who were recording that history paid with their lives. Why was this history so unpalatable to a 'liberation group'? Despite these tell-tale signs people long concerned about the Tamil problem >from the south and abroad have found it difficult to interrnalise the character of the LTTE and grasp is mindset. After every tragedy where the LTTE is accused of culpability there is confu- sion. People repeatedly ask why should the LTTE do such a thing when it was neither in the interests of the Tamils nor in its own interests. Those who best undersand the LTTE are the Tamils and particularly the very ordinary people from its heartland. Not least among the reasons why they will no speak out is that few would believe them. Whether it was the killing of Vimaleswaran, Panchalingam Amirth- lingam Rajini or Sabalingam as soon as these people grasped what had happened they had a clear idea about who was responsible. They were also closely attuned to the nuances of LTTE behaviour which did nohing to shake their confidence in their conclusions. Even in the killings of Rajiv Gandhi in India Sabalingam in Paris and of leaders in the South there was much confusion worldwide about the LTTE's responsibiliy. But in Jaffna there was no con- fusion. Such knowledge as in these instances could be termed or- ganic. It may be falsifiable in the Popperian sense. But the event of such knowledge turning out to be false would be compar- able with all human senses through which the world is conceptu- alised failing simultaneously. Bceause of their very gut feeling about the recent bomb explo- sion in Colombo and the uncertainties of life in Colombo from several quarters, many Tamils there would argue for culpability of many groups other than the LTTE. In Jaffna there was little confusion among crowds awaiting the negotiating team arriving >from Colombo that fatal morning. As they quickly dispersed home in the expectation of aerial bombers, they were heard to remark, "These fellows (the LTTE) will never let us enjoy peace!" Glorification of Suicide A high rate of suicide has been known in Jaffna for sometime. The causes have ranged from a sense of failure in a very competitive society to seemingly trivial domestic reasons such as a harsh word carelessly uttered. Quite frequently the victim after swal- lowing poison had repented the action and tried to commiserate the family while life ebbed away. There was no attempt by any serious scholar to find causes in Sangam Tamil culture of 2000 years ago. They seemed too evident in very modern socio-economic conditions peculiar to Jaffna. But once the LTTE took over this tendency to suicide and gave it institutional form to serve its need, the disposition to historical romanticisation appeared to become irresistible. Often the decision to join the LTTE is itself an act of partial suicide. Once the decision is taken it is generally too late for regrets unless the parents are well to do and influential. After being part of the group and imbibing its culture, many of the ca- dre would spontaneously volunteer for suicidal operations. Like in a religious cult group the motivations are varied. Among members there would be some general tendencies, yet some of the individuals exceptionally talented and and steady in their motivation. The tasks too require varied skill. The more rare and exceptional ones may be required to operate alone for long periods and take decisions. The more common operations would be the kind where the volunteer has to get into an explosive laden vehicle, press the accelerator and hold the steering. Can a catastrophe be averted? An unfortunate but deeply ingrained habit of the Tamil intelli- gentsia is to explain everything done by Tamils, however obnoxi- ous, by a reference to state terror. Such are among sentiments surfacing in the Tamil printed media following the bomb explo- sion. It may be safe and politically correct, but utterly sterile To maintain this position diversity has to be ignored, and the South characterised as essentially and permenently demonic. Those in the Soth trying to understand the position of Tamils and work- ing for its amelioration need to be devalued and marginalises, as has happened for decades, in order that we could continue to seek out the siren of Tamil nationalism. The reality today is much commendable work has been done in the South, and there is a vibrant peace constituency as we never had before. In provincial towns that have seen violence in the past, Sinhalese people, not just some political groups, have come out to express shame and pledge that such would not happen again. There is a government very much influenced by these sentiments. There are unpresidented openings to challenge and put an end to state terror. But Tamil politics has been moving so far to dis- troy all this, close all space and give the initiative over to state terror, chavinism and murder on both sides. We cannot just look at Tamil violence as acts of angry indivisu- als, militants or terrorists. We are talking about a fully fledged multinational institution which may be more effective in some countries than the Sri Lankan foreign service. It is an in- stitution which can suppress everything in Tamil society that is healthy and decent, while mobilising and utilizing very effi- ciently all the alienation and everything that is based. We stand in danger of loosing this opportunity and in turn triggering off a virulence of the kind not witnessed before. A question many sensitive Tamils have asked since mid 1986 is whether a society can breed something like the LTTE within its womb and come out in one piece? Or, is it necessarily fated to destruction? Many of us, despite our thinning numbers have con- tinued to say, "N, there is hope". If that hope is to be real- ised, we need to open out, pose the necessary questions, and deprive the LTTE leadership of legitimacy for doing what it has done. Only the Tamils can do that. ================================================================= The write is a member of the UHTR (Jaffna) and co-author of the "Broken Palmyra"